In this paper, we derive code-based signature schemes using Fiat-Shamir transformation on code-based zeroknowledge identification schemes, namely the Stern scheme, the Jain-Krenn-Pietrzak-Tentes scheme, and the Cayrel-Veron-El Yousfi scheme. We analyze the security of these code-based signature schemes and derive the security parameters to achieve the 128-bit level security. Furthermore, we implement these signature schemes and compare their performance on a PC.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are essential components of ITsecurity solutions. Security of the schemes, already used in practice, relies on the number-theoretic hardness assumptions. Unfortunately, these problems are known to be solvable in polynomial time on quantum computers using Shor's algorithm (Shor, 1994) . Hence, quantum computers would be able to break popular cryptosystems such as RSA or ElGamal (including its elliptic-curve variant) in polynomial time. Given these circumstances, it is important to consider the transition to post-quantum digital signature schemes. In this work, we focus on the practical use of code-based signature scheme as one of the postquantum candidates.
CFS (Courtois et al., 2001) , KKS (Kabatianskii et al., 1997) , and their variants are the most celebrated code-based signature schemes. Unfortunately, there are various drawbacks in respect of security, computation time, key or signature size. The CFS scheme was proven existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) by Dallot (Dallot, 2008) under the hardness of the Goppa-Parametrized Bounded Decoding problem and the Goppa-Code Distinguishing (GD) problem. Even with the existence of a distinguisher (Faugére et al., 2011) for the Goppa codes of high rate, a simple modification can pro-vide Strong EUF-CMA security for the CFS signature (Morozov et al., 2018) . However, from the practical prespective, signing time of CFS signature is somewhat high due to the difficulty of finding decodable syndromes. Debris-Alazard et al. (Debris-Alazard et al., 2017) exposed a problem with the recently introduced SURF signature scheme. The main drawback of the KKS-like signature schemes is their security as shown by Otmani et al. (Otmani and Tillich, 2011) . Therefore, we will explore the time-tested approach to signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transform over zero-knowledge identification schemes.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we study codebased signature schemes via Fiat-Shamir transformation on zero-knowledge (ZK) identification schemes. The Fiat-Shamir transform seems to be the promising avenue to have both efficient and secure codebased signature schemes. We chose to study and compare zero-knowledge identification schemes by Stern (Stern, 1994) , Jain et al. (Jain et al., 2012) and Cayrel et al. (Cayrel et al., 2010) . Note that Jain et al. (Jain et al., 2012) pointed out a flaw in the proof of zero-knowledge property of Veron's codebased identification scheme (Véron, 1997) , and so Jain et al. provided an alternative scheme which is indeed ZK. As security assumption, Jain et al. used the so-called Exact-LPN (xLPN) problem (Jain et al., 2012) , which is, in fact, identical to the general decoding problem considered both in Veron's paper, and in this work. 1 There are some existing studies on the efficient implementation of Stern's scheme by Gaborit et al. (Gaborit and Girault, 2007) , and Cayrel et al. (Cayrel et al., 2008) . El Yousfi et al. (Alaoui et al., 2013) have studied the implementations of Stern (Stern, 1994) , Veron (Véron, 1997) and Cayrel et al. (Cayrel et al., 2010) . However, these works show system parameters for identification schemes that achieve 80-bit security. Due to the growing power of modern computing systems, it seems preferable to investigate the performance of the signature schemes for 128-bit security benchmark. We implement in C the digital signatures based on Stern's (Stern, 1994) , Jain et al.'s (Jain et al., 2012) and Cayrel et al.'s (Cayrel et al., 2010) identification schemes, and compare their performance on a PC.
PRELIMINARIES

Notations
We will use the following notations throughout the article.
• {0, 1} * : bit string of arbitrary length.
• F q : Galois field of q elements.
• F n q : Vector with n elements over F q . • F m×n q : Matrix with m rows and n columns whose elements are in F q .
• wt(c): Hamming weight of string c, i.e., the number of non-zero positions of the string.
• : Concatenation of strings. We see a string as a column vector.
Zero-knowledge Identification Scheme
An identification scheme consists of three probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms (G, P,V ) such that:
• The randomized key generation algorithm G takes as input the security parameter 1 λ . It outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk), where pkis called the public key and sk is called the private key. We assume the security parameter is implicit in both pk and sk. • P and V are interactive protocols. The prover algorithm P takes as input a private key sk and the verification algorithm V takes as input a public key pk. At the conclusion of the protocol, V outputs 1 or ⊥. It holds the following properties: Completeness: [P(sk),V (pk)] = 1.
Honest V always accepts honest P. Soundness: Pr([P * ,V (pk)] = 1) = negl (λ).
Cheating P * (not knowing sk) is rejected with overwhelming probability.
Cheating V * learns nothing about sk.
Digital Signature
A digital signature scheme Σ = (Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification) is consists of three algorithms. Key Generation:
The key generation algorithm takes a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk). Signature Generation: The signature generation algorithm takes a message m and a private key skas inputs and outputs a signature σ on the message m. Signature Verification: The signature verification algorithm takes as input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ, and outputs a bit denoting accept or reject, respectively. The standard security notion for a signature scheme is existential unforgeability against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA): The forger gets a public key from a challenger who generates a key pair (sk, pk). The forger can query a signing oracle on polynomially many messages m i hereby obtaining signatures σ i . The forger can also issue a hash query and obtains its hash value. We say that the forger wins the EUF-CMA game, if the forger successfully outputs a pair (m * , σ * ), where σ * is a valid signature of a message m * under the private key with the restriction that m * has never appeared in the query phase.
Security Assumptions
An [n, k] Linear Code C is a subspace of dimension k of the vector space F n q . A linear code can be described by its Parity-check matrix H. The parity-check matrix describes the code as follows:
The product Hx is known as the syndrome of the vector x. Definition 1. Gilbert-Varshamov Bound:
where H q is the q-ary entropy function Now, we describe the main hard problems on which the security of code-based signature schemes, presented in the paper, relies. Definition 2. Syndrome Decoding Problem (SDP) (Augot et al., 2003) :
, a positive integer ω, and a vector s ∈ F n−k 2 . Output: a codeword x such that wt(x) = ω where 0 < ω ≤ ω and Hx = s. This problem is NP-complete (Berlekamp et al., 1978) , which means that at least some instances of the problem are difficult. However, it is a common belief that they should be difficult on average (for wellchosen parameter ranges), which means that random instances are difficult. It is also proved that there exists a unique solution to SDP if the weight ω is below the GV Bound. Definition 3. General Decoding Problem (GDP): Input: a matrix G ∈ F k×n 2 , a non negative integer ω, and a vector y ∈ F n 2 . Output: a pair (m, e) ∈ F k 2 × F n 2 such that wt(e) = ω where 0 < ω ≤ ω and mG ⊕ e = y. An extension of SDP over arbitrary finite field is as follows: Definition 4. q-ary Syndrome Decoding Problem (q-SDP) (Augot et al., 2003) :
, a non negative integer ω and a vector s ∈ F n−k q . Output: a codeword x such that of wt(x) = ω where 0 < ω ≤ ω and Hx = s. q-SDP is proven to be NP-hard by S.Barg (Barg, 1994) . Definition 5. Exact Learning Parity with Noise (xLPN) (Jain et al., 2012) :
SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we will derive the signature scheme from code-based zero-knowledge identification schemes. Using Fiat-Shamir transformation (Pointcheval and Stern, 2000) , we can derive signature schemes from the Stern (Stern, 1994) and Jain et al. (Jain et al., 2012) identification schemes. We need to use the extended version of Fiat-Shamir transformation (Alaoui et al., 2012) to derive a signature scheme from Cayrel et al.'s scheme (Cayrel et al., 2010) .
Stern Signature Scheme.
System Parameters. The Stern signature scheme uses the following system parameters:
• Positive integer n (length of codeword),
• Positive integer k such that k < n (dimension of the code),
• Positive integer ω (minimum distance of the code),
Key Generation. The key generation algorithm outputs the pair of the private key s and public key y.
1. Sample a vector s ∈ F n 2 such that wt(s) = ω. 2. Calculate a vector y ∈ F n−k 2 as y = Hs.
3. Output private key s and public key y.
Signature Generation. Takes as input private key s and a message m, and output Sig. The detailed algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
Signature Verification. Takes as input public key y,
and wt(σ i (s)) = ω.
, or ⊥ otherwise. 
; 9 sig i = c i rsp i ; end 10 Sig ← sig 0 sig 1 · · · sig δ−1 ; return Sig;
Jain et al. Signature Scheme
In this section, we will derive the signature scheme from the identification scheme of (Jain et al., 2012) . We will modify the design a little, without any security breach, for the sake of fast implementation.
System Parameters. The signature scheme uses the system parameters as in Stern signature scheme apart from random sampling of A ∈ F k×n
Key Generation. The key generation algorithm outputs the pair of the private key e and public key y.
1. Sample (s, e) ←$ F k 2 × F n 2 such that wt(e) = ω. 2. Calculate y = sA ⊕ e.
3. Output private key e and public key y.
Signature Generation. The signature generation algorithm takes private key e and a message m, output Sig, and system parameters as inputs. Algorithm 2 describes the detailed algorithm. 
for some x and σ i ∈ S n Check c i,0 ← h(σ i y i,0 ), c i,2 ← h(y i,2 ), (b i = 1) and y i,0 ⊕ σ −1 i (y i,2 ) ⊕ y = xA, for some x Check c i,1 ← h(y i,1 ), c i,2 ← h(y i,2 ), (b i = 2) and wt(y 1,i ⊕ y 2,i ) = ω , or ⊥ otherwise.
Cayrel et al. Signature Scheme
To present the Cayrel et al., signature scheme, first we introduce a special transformation that will be used in the scheme. Definition 6. Let σ ∈ S n and γ = (γ 1 , · · · , γ n ) ∈ (F * q ) n such that γ i = 0 for all i. The transformation Π γ,σ is defined as follows:
Notice that this transformation is linear transformation, and satisfies Π γ,σ (v + w) = Π γ,σ (v) + Π γ,σ (w) and Π γ,σ (αv) = αΠ γ,σ (v) for all v, w, α ∈ F q . Furthermore, the transformation preserves the Hamming weight of the vector. Now, we are in the state to present the signature scheme:
System Parameters. The signature scheme uses the following system parameters:
• Matrix H ∈ F (n−k)×n q sampled randomly,
1. Sample a vector s ∈ F n q such that wt(s) = ω. 2. Calculate a vector y ∈ F n−k q as y = Hs.
Signature Generation. The signature generation algorithm takes as input private key s and a message m, and output a signature Sig. The detailed algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
Signature Verification. The signature verification algorithm takes public key y, message m, and signature Sig as inputs. It computes α i ← O 1 (m c i ) and b i ← O 2 (m c i α i β i ); then, it outputs 1 if the following respective equation is valid for all 0 ≤ i ≤ δ − 1:
, or ⊥ otherwise.
SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PARAMETER SELECTION
Best Known Attack: It is required to consider structural attack and key-recovery attack to measure the security of code-based signature schemes. Due to the 
return Sig;
use of random code only, consideration of structural attack abolish. Signature schemes, constructed by using Fiat-Shamir transformation and it is extended version on zero knowledge identification schemes, are EUF-CMA secure (Pointcheval and Stern, 2000; Alaoui et al., 2012) . Moreover, EUF-CMA security includes the security against key-recovery attack. Therefore, to choose secure parameters, it is required to measure the hardness of the problem, where the proof of EUF-CMA security is reduced. The security of the Stern and Cayrel et al. signatures are reduced to the hardness of SDP and qSDP, respectively. The most efficient known algorithm to attack SDP is the Information Set Decoding (ISD) algorithm by Stern (Stern, 1988) . Further, there are few many improvements over (Stern, 1988) . One of the intermediate notable improvement is by Finiasz et al. (Finiasz and Sendrier, 2009 ). Further improvements over (Finiasz and Sendrier, 2009 ) are asymptotic (May et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012) . So, we have used the measurement of (Finiasz and Sendrier, 2009) to measure the hardness of SDP. The hardness of q-ary SDP is measured by the formulation of (Niebuhr et al., 2017) , which is the extension of (Finiasz and Sendrier, 2009 ) from binary to an arbitrary finite field.
Security of Jain et al. signature scheme is reduced to the hardness of xLPN. However, in actuality, the number of sample of the instance is small, and we cannot apply the BKW algorithm to solve the xLPN problem. So, the hardness is turned down to the hard- 24.0 kB 65.5 kB ness of the general decoding problem. We thus have used the measurement of (Finiasz and Sendrier, 2009) to measure the hardness.
Stern Signature Scheme
We select parameters n, k and ω so that they lie on the GV bound i.e.,
to maximize the security against attacks using the ISD algorithm. We select k = n/2 and ω is around 0.110n. The complexity of the ISD (Finiasz and Sendrier, 2009 ) is
where l = log 2 2ω k p for the parameters on the GV bound, and n should satisfy WF ISD (n, k, ω) > 2 λ .
The number of rounds δ depends on a soundness error of the underlying identification scheme. The soundness error of the Stern identification scheme (Stern, 1994) is 2/3. So, δ should satisfy (2/3) δ < 2 −λ . System parameters and data sizes are presented in Table 1 .
Jain et al. Signature Scheme
We select parameters n, k and ω according to the equation 1 & 2. The number of rounds δ depends on the Soundness error of the underlying identification scheme. Soundness error of the Jain et al. identification scheme (Jain et al., 2012) is 2/3. So, δ should satisfy (2/3) δ < 2 −λ . System parameters and data sizes are presented in Table 2 . We select parameters n, k and ω so that they lie on the GV bound i.e.,
to maximize the security against attacks using the ISD algorithm. We select k = n/2 and ω is around 0.380n. The relevant formula to evaluate work factor is as follows (Niebuhr et al., 2017) :
, p = p 1 + p 2 , p 2 = p 2 /2 , λ q = 1 − e −1 ≈ 0.63 and p 2 /2 means maximum integer that does not exceed p 2 /2. n should satisfy WF ISD (n, k, ω) > 2 λ . The number of rounds δ depends on the Soundness error of the underlying identification scheme. Soundness error of the Cayrel et al. identification scheme (Cayrel et al., 2010) is 1/2. So, δ should satisfy (1/2) δ < 2 −λ . System parameters and data sizes are presented in Table 3 .
IMPLEMENTATIONS
We implement the Stern, Jain et al. and Cayrel et al. signature schemes with 128-bit level security in C language. Execution time and data sizes are presented in Table 4 show the execution time of the signature schemes on a PC with a 3.5 GHz CPU and 16 GB of RAM and the size of the secret key, public key, and a signature. The size of the input messages is 32 B.
Alaoui et al. (Alaoui et al., 2013) , implemented the signature schemes of Stern, Veron and Cayrel et al. for 80 bits of security. Further, security of Veron's 
CONCLUSION
We derived code-based signature schemes using Fiat-Shamir transformation on code-based zeroknowledge identification schemes: the Stern scheme, the Jain-Krenn-Pietrzak-Tentes scheme, and the Cayrel-Veron-Alaoui scheme. We then analyzed the security of the three signature schemes and derived the security parameters to achieve the 128-bit level of security. Furthermore, we implemented these signature schemes and compared their performance on a PC. Our security analysis and implementation show the Stern signature scheme is the most efficient regarding the size of the secret and public key and the execution time of key generation and signature verification, and the Cayrel et al. scheme is the most superior in terms of signature size. The signature generation of the Jain et al. scheme is the fastest, but the signature verification of the scheme is slowest. In our future work, we will optimize the implementation for IoT devices and study techniques for reducing the signature size.
